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ThuCyDIDES
have been teaching and reading thucydides since the fall of 1975, and over that 
nearly forty-year period I have increasingly come to appreciate his enormous 
skills as a historian, as well as his sophisticated theoretical understanding of war. 
It is not that thucydides set out to be a theorist in his account of the Pelopon-
nesian War. rather, the subtext of his depiction of the great war between athens 
and sparta presents a theory of conflict that in the power of its analysis helps to 
clarify not only the events of the war but also fundamental, theoretical truths 
about the nature and consequences of human conflict, truths as relevant today as 
they were late in the fifth century bC.1 this combination of history with a sophis-
ticated theoretical basis more than justifies thucydides’s claim at the beginning 
of his account: “and it may be that my history may seem less easy to read because 
of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if 
my words are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events 
which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will at 
some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.”2 
thucydides amply delivers on his hope that his account will prove useful to 
those who think about the issues surrounding war and strategy in the future.3 
In fact, in the strategy and Policy course at the Naval War College, the week 
devoted to an examination of the Peloponnesian War is far and away the most 
popular among the students.4 Why? My guess is that the students catch the inter-
connection in thucydides’s discussion between its account of the course of that 
particular war and its theoretical understanding of war’s fundamental nature—a 
connection made in a way that is not true of that other great theorist of war, the 
Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.5 
Theorist of War
williamson Murray
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In fact, there is a noteworthy and important difference between thucydides 
and Clausewitz: the latter focuses almost exclusively on the conduct of human 
conflict and military operations, as he makes clear from the beginning of on war. 
thus Clausewitz limits himself to a narrower field than thucydides, although his 
discussion of human conflict is no less brilliant in its examination of war, the re-
lationship of human conflict to politics, the conduct of military operations, and 
of course, war’s fundamental nature. However, the larger issues involved—grand 
strategy, policy itself, morality, and the impact of war on the values of civilized 
states—he leaves to others to examine. Unfortunately there have been few other 
theorists or historians who have addressed those issues with anything like the 
sophistication of thucydides. 
thucydides has taken as his subject the whole tapestry of the Peloponnesian 
War: the origins of the conflict; the impact of war on the human condition; the 
inherent tension among expediency, morality, and humane behavior under the 
unremitting pressures of conflict; and the fundamental nature of war, including 
the psychological aspects of battle, where soldiers are engaged in the bloody busi-
ness of killing. significantly, John Keegan, in his brilliant, groundbreaking book 
The Face of Battle, identifies thucydides as one of the few historians who have 
realistically described the “sharp end” of fighting.
It is the purpose of this article, then, to draw out some of the more significant 
theoretical observations that The History of the Peloponnesian war offers in its 
dark portrayal of that terrible war, which destroyed the economic and political 
basis of the greatest cultural and literary flowering in human history. We will be-
gin with a general discussion of thucydides’s basic depiction of the fundamental 
nature of war and then move on to areas where I believe he presents his most 
pertinent and thorough observations on conflict and the human condition: his 
examination of the factors that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (fac-
tors that have contributed to the outbreak of other great wars as well); the impact 
of war on human society and civilized standards, including the tensions between 
morality and humane behavior; and finally, the reasons why civil wars represent 
the most terrible of all human conflicts.
the great classicist bernard Knox laid out the intellectual accomplishments of 
fifth-century athens in a lecture to the Naval War College in 1972: “the athens 
in which [thucydides] lived was one of the most intellectually and artistically 
creative cities the world has ever seen. . . . yet of all this there is not one word in 
thucydides except some extremely faint allusions in Pericles’ funeral speech.”6 
the reason for this lay in thucydides’s single-minded focus on the complexities, 
difficulties, and consequences involved in the waging of war. that said, it is worth 
noting that this greek historian’s interests ranged from the highest levels of grand 
strategy to that of the battlefield, where men engage in the merciless processes 
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of killing each other.7 by means of this focus thucydides is able to examine with 
honesty and ruthlessness the reality of war—not glory, not colorful parades, little 
but desolation and tragedy, yet a fundamental and everlasting part of the human 
tableau. 
the universe thucydides describes is a remarkably grim one. the gods, if they 
exist, could not care less about human affairs. In this dark world, as athenian 
negotiators warn the inhabitants of Melos in demanding their surrender, 
the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and . . . in fact 
the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept.8 so far as the favor of the gods is concerned, we think we have as much right 
to that as you have. our aims and our actions are perfectly consistent with the beliefs 
men hold about the gods and with the principles that govern their own conduct. our 
opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general 
and necessary law of nature to rule wherever one can. this is not a law that we made 
ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it in ex-
istence and we shall leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us. We are 
merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the 
same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.9
Much as has been the case for the modern world, war was a principal, if not the 
principal, preoccupation of the greeks. In fact, one modern author has gone so 
far as to title his book on the period The warring States of greece.10 thucydides’s 
view of war resembles closely that of Clausewitz. In on war, the Prussian military 
thinker comments that “no other human activity is so continuously or univer-
sally bound up with chance.” thus, “from the very start, there is an interplay of 
possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the 
length and breadth of the tapestry.”11 He notes later in his account, “War is the 
realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such 
incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more 
uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.”12
Tychē (chance) makes constant appearances throughout thucydides’s ac-
count.13 one might even suggest that thucydides, like Clausewitz, possessed a 
modern sense that nonlinear factors determine the course of events.14 His uni-
verse is one where uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction, as well as incompetence, 
dominate the actions of men. Moreover, the impact of tychē renders nearly all 
great events and decisions contingent: on personalities, on the relations and 
interrelationship between and among statesmen and military leaders, on the 
impact of the unforeseen or the unpredictable, and on the ability, among a host 
of other factors, of a single individual, even at the lowest level, to retard or thwart 
the best-laid plans.15 In particular, the competence, or more often the incom-
petence, of individuals plays an unpredictable role in the unfolding of history’s 
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course.16 Moreover, unexpected second- and third-order effects add to the dif-
ficulty of executing any strategy, whether political or military.17 finally, as U.s. 
forces rediscovered in both Iraq and afghanistan, the enemy always “gets a vote.” 
again, it is not that thucydides spells out this atmosphere of chance, ambiguity, 
friction, and uncertainty but that they suffuse his account of everything from 
diplomacy to combat. 
thucydides’s discussion of the events surrounding the theban attack on Pla-
taea in The History of the Peloponnesian war underlines brilliantly the role that 
friction and tychē can and do play in thwarting the best-laid plans. at the time 
the incident occurs, in 431 bC, greece is teetering on the brink of a long-awaited 
war between athens and sparta. the thebans decide to capitalize on that fact to 
seize their longtime hostile neighbor, the smaller polis of Plataea. they have set 
the stage for a coup with meticulous planning; they have reached out to traitors 
within the city who have agreed to disarm its guards and keep the gates open. the 
thebans sneak a commando force across the boeotian hills separating the two 
cities. the advance party reaches its target and catches the Plataeans by surprise. 
the traitors open the gates, panic breaks out, and the theban raiders announce 
that they have seized control of the polis. at the same time, in the early evening, 
a larger occupying force leaves thebes to secure the victory. thus far everything 
has worked perfectly. 
but then friction and tychē intercede. as the main force makes its way across 
the hilly terrain in the gathering gloom, it begins to rain. the torches sputter, 
the asopus river swells with runoff, and the trail, increasingly muddy, slows all 
movement. at times the guides lose their way in the darkness, and the force halts 
in confusion. Meanwhile, in Plataea, the locals, at first terrorized by the sudden 
eruption of theban soldiers, recover their courage as they perceive there is only a 
small body of the enemy in their midst. the Plataeans regain control of the gates. 
at that point the morale of the theban commandos, who had been embold-
ened by their initial success, collapses. they realize that their reinforcements have 
been delayed, and the strangeness of their surroundings adds to their dismay. 
the Plataeans seize the initiative. burrowing between their buildings, through 
the walls from building to building, and moving over the roofs, they harry their 
enemies and then eventually force them to surrender. In the early hours of the 
morning the main party of thebans arrives, only to find the gates of Plataea 
barred and their commando force either dead or prisoner.18 With that flawed 
military operation, caught up in the entanglements of friction and chance, the 
great war between athens and sparta begins. 
but this is not the only place where chance, friction, and their handmaiden, 
incompetence, appear. as with the modern world, individuals at every level make 
an immense contribution to the tangled course of events. all too often they gum 
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up the works with their incompetence or (on all too few occasions) redirect the 
flow of events by virtue of the competence they exhibit on the battlefield or in 
debate. Nothing underlines that pattern more clearly than the sorry tale of the 
athenian expedition to sicily in 415 bC. as Clausewitz suggests, “the personali-
ties of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it 
is vital not to underrate them.”19 
In 415 bC, an angry debate took place before the athenian assembly. alcibiades, 
one of socrates’s leading students, argued for a raid on the sicilian city of syra-
cuse. His opponent was the conservative politician Nicias. the assembly then 
voted in favor of the proposal. on the next day Nicias, determined to undermine 
the proposed raid, spoke again, this time urging—in the belief the assembly 
would see thereby the foolishness of such an expedition—that the raiding force 
be vastly increased. but as was to occur again, Nicias was being too clever by half. 
the athenians voted in favor of Nicias’s proposal, and if that were not enough, 
they appointed Nicias himself, along with alcibiades and one other, to lead what 
was now to be a great expedition.20
to make matters even worse, shortly before the expedition departed some 
drunks knocked the erect phalli off the statues of Hermes that stood before many 
households. alcibiades’s enemies accused him of the sacrilege and managed to 
have the young politician-general recalled from the expedition, which had by 
this time departed.21 Instead of returning to the city, he deserted to the spartans, 
knowing that with most of his supporters away on the expedition, his enemies 
now dominated in athens, and the assembly would undoubtedly condemn him 
to death. the naval and ground force, now dominated by Nicias, continued on, 
ultimately meeting a disastrous end at syracuse, even after the athenians sent 
out major reinforcements at his urging.22 Nicias’s extraordinarily incompetent 
performance led the athenians to chisel his name from the various decrees and 
treaties that he had participated in signing.
alcibiades’s fate further underlines the unique role that exceptional individu-
als play in history. furious at his recall and fearing for his life, he had deserted 
to sparta, where he provided his one-time enemies with a war-winning strategy 
against athens. His time in sparta was relatively short, however, as he managed 
to get the spartan queen pregnant. He then fled to Persia, where he provided the 
former mortal enemy of the greek city-states with a strategy to keep the spartans 
and athenians busy killing each other rather than interfering in the affairs of 
greek city-states under Persian control. alcibiades’s career reached its end when 
he returned to help the athenians in putting down a revolt of athens’s allies and in 
removing from power an oligarchy that had attempted to replace the democracy. 
this was indeed an astonishing political career, almost unmatched in history.
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from the beginning of his account, thucydides places enormous emphasis 
on the wild cards of history, those entirely unpredictable individuals of genius 
who appear and by their statesmanship or military leadership channel the course 
of events into entirely new and unexpected directions.23 It was that ability that 
marks the extraordinary career of the spartan general brasidas, who led a Helot 
army—which by itself is an extraordinary comment on his leadership abilities, 
given the treatment the spartans inflicted on their Helot serfs—from the Pelo-
ponnesus in a campaign against the athenians. His efforts came close to under-
mining athens’s strategic position in the northern aegean. only his death at the 
battle of amphipolis prevented a most dangerous situation from developing that 
might well have ended thucydides’s account at that point.24 
THe originS oF THe war
one of the most fundamental questions that those who study war, strategy, 
and diplomacy must address is why great wars occur, as well as the particular 
circumstances that lead to the outbreak of conflicts between great states. Not 
surprisingly, thucydides is at his best in describing the outbreak of the Pelopon-
nesian War. He addresses the problem in a twofold manner. the overarching 
cause he places in a simple, straightforward sentence: “What made war inevitable 
was the growth of athenian power and the fear which this caused in sparta.”25 
thus, he establishes the precondition not only for the war he is about to discuss 
but for most other major wars that have occurred. one might equally posit that 
the outbreak of the U.s. Civil War was the result of the growth in the power of 
the Northern states and the fear that it occasioned among southerners. equally 
plausible would be an explanation of the first World War that ran along the fol-
lowing lines: the growth of german power and the fear that it occasioned among 
the entente powers.26 
but the larger explanation is sufficient only for explaining why a war occurred 
during a specific period in history. It fails to unravel the tangled web of confusion, 
uncertainty, and miscalculation that are the bedfellows of all those who shape and 
form grand strategy. the strategic situation in the late 430s bC was similar to a 
fuel-air mixture waiting to explode. the second question, then, that the historian 
must address is why the war broke out in 431 bC and not 433 or 429. similarly, 
the historian of the first World War must ask, Why war in 1914 and not 1911, or 
for that matter in 1916? that is precisely what thucydides sets out to explain: “as 
for the reasons for breaking the truce and declaring war, . . . they are as follows.”27 
Winston Churchill aptly characterized the situation confronting the powers 
before the outbreak of the first World War: “It has been well said, ‘there is always 
more error than design in human affairs.’ the limited minds of even the ablest of 
men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion in which they dwell, their 
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transient and partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem itself so 
far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspect.”28 
Ironically, and as was to be the case with the first World War, the spark that ex-
ploded the growing tension between athens and sparta into a great war came in 
a peripheral area of the greek world, along the coast of the balkans. 
there the city of Corcyra (modern-day Corfu) found itself involved in an 
increasingly nasty confrontation with its mother city (that is, having originally 
established it as a colony), Corinth. the quarrel spiraled into open conflict in 
which the Corcyrean forces crushed those of the Corinthians. refusing to accept 
defeat at the hands of its colony, the Corinthians attempted to mobilize their 
economic and military power as well as that of their allies to crush their upstart 
colony. fearful of the Corinthians, the Corcyreans went to the athenians with 
a clear warning that they put in simple terms. everyone in greece knows, they 
argued, that war between you and the spartans is coming. ally with us and add 
our considerable naval power to that you already possess, which will ensure your 
naval dominance of the greek world, when war comes, or stand aside and allow 
the Corinthians and their Peloponnesian allies—that is, the spartans—to acquire 
our naval power and thus be in a position to challenge your control of the seas. 
Interestingly, ambassadors from Corinth addressed the athenian assembly as 
well, and at the same time, but their arguments, that war was not on the horizon 
between athens and sparta, proved less persuasive than those of their adversar-
ies. by a close vote the athenian assembly agreed to a defensive alliance with 
Corcyra and sent a small squadron of ten triremes to Corcyra to warn the Corin-
thians off.29 the athenians then reconsidered and sent a larger naval force, which 
arrived in the nick of time to save their new allies from defeat.
that action infuriated the Corinthians and lit the fuse for the great war that 
soon overwhelmed the greek world. as a defensive measure, the athenians at-
tacked their own ally Potidaea, which they believed was too closely connected to 
Corinth, which was its mother city as well, an action that only further enraged 
the Corinthians. thucydides lays out, in a series of brilliant speeches, how the 
spartans found themselves drawn into the conflagration. In these debates states-
men with opposing views lay out the pros and cons of going to war. Here one 
must underline the crucial importance of such speeches to thucydides’s account 
of the factors that led inevitably to war, as well as what the participants believed 
to be the proper strategic courses for their poleis to follow. 
In our world, drenched as it is with the overblown rhetoric of campaign 
speeches, which are innumerable, are eminently forgettable, and reveal little of 
policy making, it is all too easy to skip over the speeches that thucydides re-
cords. but in the greek world, where literacy was a relatively new phenomenon 
and there was nothing resembling the modern media, speeches were the means 
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through which the major decisions of strategy were made.30 Moreover, they 
represent a brilliant dissection of the making and shaping of grand strategy and 
operational strategy.
the most brilliant of these speeches is the oration given by the spartan king 
archidamus in the debate that took place before the spartan assembly of warriors 
as to whether sparta should go to war with athens:31
spartans, in the course of my life I have taken part in many wars, and I see among 
you people of the same age as I am. they and I have had experience and so are not 
likely to share in what may be the general enthusiasm for war, nor to think that war 
is a good thing or a safe thing. and you will find, if you look closely into the mat-
ter, that this present war which you are now discussing is not likely to be on a small 
scale. When we are engaged with Peloponnesians . . . , the forces on both sides are 
of the same type, and we can strike rapidly where we wish to strike. With athens it 
is different. Here we shall be engaged with people who live far off, people who have 
the widest experience with the sea and who are extremely well equipped in all other 
directions, very wealthy both as individuals and as a state, with ships and cavalry and 
hoplites and a population bigger than that in any other place in Hellas, and then too, 
with numbers of allies who pay tribute to them.32
archidamus then proceeds to lay out the extraordinary difficulties that the 
spartans would confront should they embark on such a war. He asks his listeners, 
“What sort of war, then, are we going to fight?”33 but his speech is not an antiwar 
speech, protesting the possibility of war between athens and sparta. rather, it a 
speech against war now in favor of war later, for solid strategic reasons. He warns 
that sparta needs to make careful and thorough preparations before embarking 
on such a war with the other “superpower” of the greek world. In every respect 
archidamus’s speech represented a brilliant analysis of grand strategy, resting 
on what we would today call a thorough “net assessment” of the opposing sides. 
However, his arguments failed to resonate with the spartan assembly of warriors, 
undoubtedly because it offered no easy, simple, direct path to victory. the other 
speaker whom thucydides presents, the ephor (i.e., one of five elected leaders 
who served with the two kings) sthenelaidas, dismisses archidamus’s arguments 
with the clear notion that marching directly into attica will end the war in short 
order. Ironically, archidamus’s strategy will prove to be the path the spartans will 
eventually follow to victory, but it will be that much more difficult because the 
spartans will not have addressed the strategic issues that archidamus has raised. 
the spartans instead vote for a simple and direct approach: march into attica; 
burn the crops, temples, and houses that lie outside athens’s walls; and then de-
feat the athenian hoplites, who, furious at the destruction occurring before their 
eyes, would inevitably come out to fight. It seems simpleminded and obtuse, in 
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view of what we know will happen. yet it is well to remember, as thucydides indi-
cates in book 2, it would only be by the most desperate measures that Pericles, the 
athenian leader, was to prevent the athenian assembly from meeting when at-
tica outside the city walls was in flames—a meeting that would surely have voted 
to send the hoplites out to confront the invaders directly. It would have been a 
battle the athenians would have lost. but as it is, the athenian hoplites decline 
to take up the challenge, nor in subsequent spartan invasions are they willing to 
meet the enemy directly in phalanx battle. 
In the end, strategic decision making is a matter of choosing between different 
and difficult paths; sometimes both will be right, sometimes one will be right and 
one wrong, sometimes both will be wrong, but the future will always be opaque 
and difficult to estimate.34 In the end, as James Wolfe commented before Quebec 
in 1759, “War is an option of difficulties.”35 
at some point in the articulation of military forces against an opponent, things 
will go wrong, and more often than not they will go very wrong. thus, whatever 
the perceptiveness and intelligence of the thinking and strategic preparation for 
war, the sophistication of the military preparations, or the brilliance of those in 
command, one must count on friction, chance, and unexpected enemy reaction 
to interfere with, delay, or even entirely thwart the efforts of military forces, 
whether one is dealing with strategy, operations, or tactics. thucydides has made 
a sophisticated point in the contrast between archidamus’s speech and that of the 
ephor, but he has not spelled it out for the reader. rather, he has left readers to 
draw out its significance for themselves.36 
war and THe collaPSe oF HUMan valUeS
Perhaps the gravest warning that thucydides left for those who came after lay 
in his description of the slow but steady decline in the behavior of the opposing 
sides displayed as the conflict continued. Immediately before the war’s outbreak, 
the athenians justify the possession of their empire on the basis not only of ex-
pediency but of the assertion that they have behaved better toward their subjects 
and allies than might be expected under the circumstances.37 that is certainly 
not a statement they would have dared, or even wished, to make later in the war. 
again it is the subtle fashion in which thucydides recounts the history of the war 
that allows him to underline the tragic collapse of humane values under the pres-
sure and deadly atmosphere of war. there is in his view a clear connection be-
tween what the plague of 430 bC does to athenian values and what the war itself 
does to them—except perhaps that war will do so in a more murderous fashion.38
the issues surrounding events on Mytilene and then on Melos highlight the 
collapse of values, and even common sense, in athens over the course of the war. 
9
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In the first case a revolt had broken out on the strategically well placed island 
of Mytilene, but the spartans had dithered in reinforcing the rebels, while the 
athenians had reacted with dispatch and crushed the rebellion with the help of 
Mytileneans who remained loyal. the question came before the athenian assem-
bly as to what should be done with the captured islanders. Initially the assembly 
decreed that all the men should be put to death and the women and children 
sold into slavery. but the next day the athenians, many appalled by the decision, 
reconsidered. 
thucydides condenses the debate to two speakers. on one side, the dema-
gogue Cleon urges that the initial decision should stand as a warning to the rest 
of the athenian empire. His approach rests to an extent on basic morality: they 
have done evil to you (and to their own oaths) and should be punished. on the 
other hand, diodotus argues that the athenians should punish only those guilty 
of instigating and participating in the rebellion.39 His argument centers on the 
belief that such an approach would encourage others of athens’s allies and subject 
people who confront brewing rebellions to remain loyal. Cleon’s approach, he 
warns, would only encourage those who have revolted to fight to the bitter end. 
twelve years later, shortly before the athenian expedition to sicily embarked 
on its disastrous course, the athenians determined to remove the neutral island 
of Melos from the strategic table.40 Most of the scholarly focus has remained on 
the brilliant dialogue between the Melian representatives and those of the athe-
nians, but thucydides makes a fundamental point about the fate of the Melians 
that is too often missed.41 In one sentence, he records the fate of the Melians: 
“siege operations were now carried on vigorously and, as there was treachery 
from the inside, the Melians surrendered unconditionally to the athenians, who 
put to death all the men of military age whom they took, and sold the women 
and children as slaves.”42 
What is noteworthy about this account is that it underlines that diodotus was 
right—someone in Melos did betray the city. However, thucydides gives no indi-
cation that there was a serious debate in athens about what the fate of the Melians 
should be after their resistance had collapsed.43 In other words, the athenians 
were now willing to slaughter the Melians without even considering the potential 
negative consequences to their own future strategic interests. 
as the war continued its terrible course, the athenians seem to have lost not 
only their sense of humanity but their common sense as well. an episode in 406 
bC offers a vivid example. despite the disaster at sicily and the revolt of some of 
their allies, the athenians, with considerable help from alcibiades, recovered. 
In 406 they were even able to win a devastating victory over the Peloponnesian 
fleet at the battle of arginusae. they lost only twenty-five ships, while the spar-
tans and their allies lost seventy. arginusae seemingly heralded the complete 
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restoration of athenian fortunes. but at the end of the battle a storm had come 
up; the athenian fleet had not been able to save many of the athenians still alive 
in the water or bodies of the dead. despite the victory, the assembly, urged on by 
a madness that had clearly gripped the city and its politicians, condemned six of 
the admirals to death for impious behavior in failing to attend to the living and 
dead in the water. 
Unfortunately, thucydides died before he could complete his historical ac-
count, so the dismal years that led to the final athenian catastrophe were left to 
be covered by Xenophon—and Xenophon, though a student of socrates, brought 
to his account none of the great historian’s sophistication.44 
civil war
thucydides is equally clear in his warning about the consequences of “civil war.” 
It has become fashionable in the modern age, at least since the french revolu-
tion, to believe that revolutions bring general benefits for the human race.45 In 
his account of the events on Corcyra in the early years of the Peloponnesian 
War, however, thucydides presents us with the course and consequence of a 
real case—civil war. the murderous conflict among the contending classes and 
factions on Corcyra, in which families found themselves torn apart, has found 
its echo all too often in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. at one point, 
according to thucydides, the Corcyreans
seized upon all their enemies whom they could find and put them to death. . . .  
[t]hey went to the temple of Hera and persuaded about fifty of the suppliants there 
to submit to trial. they then condemned every one of them to death. seeing what 
was happening, most of the other suppliants, who had refused to be tried, killed each 
other there in the temple; some hanged themselves on the trees, and others found 
various other means of committing suicide. . . . during the [next] seven days the 
Corcyreans continued to massacre those of their own citizens whom they consid-
ered to be their enemies. their victims were accused of conspiring to overthrow the 
democracy, but in fact men were often killed on grounds of personal hatred or else by 
their debtors. . . . there was death in every shape and form. and, as usually happens 
in such situations, people went to every extreme and beyond it.46 
In his depiction of the atmosphere that surrounded the civil war on Corcyra 
thucydides is at his most brilliant. He points out that on Corcyra, in the midst 
of the civil war, “to fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change 
their meanings. What used to be called a thoughtless act of aggression was now 
regarded as the courage one would now expect to find in a party member; . . . any 
idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character.”47 
george orwell would underline the same phenomenon in both his great novels, 
animal Farm and 1984. In a depiction that eerily evokes the contest between 
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stalin and leon trotsky for political control of the soviet Union after lenin’s 
death, thucydides remarks: 
as a rule those who were least remarkable for intelligence showed the greater powers 
of survival. such people recognized their own deficiencies and the superior intel-
ligence of their opponents; fearing that they might lose by debate or find themselves 
out-manoeuvred in intrigue by their quick-witted enemies, they boldly launched 
straight into action; while their opponents, overconfident that they would see what 
was happening in advance, and not thinking it necessary to seize by force what they 
could secure by policy, were the more easily destroyed because they were off their 
guard.48
HUMan naTUre in iTS TrUe colorS
thucydides’s sharpest comment on the direct and indirect results of war is con-
tained at the end of his discussion of the civil war on Corcyra. these dark words 
should be remembered by all who embark on war. It is not a warning aimed at 
preventing war, which, as thucydides suggests, is a fundamental part of hu-
man nature. rather it is a warning against embarking on war without thinking 
through the terrible consequences, direct and indirect, that will inevitably occur: 
“then, with the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, hu-
man nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist, showed itself proudly 
in its true colours, as something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate 
to the idea of justice, the enemy to anything superior to itself; for if it had not 
been for the pernicious power of envy, men would not so have exalted vengeance 
above innocence and profit above justice.”49
thucydides did indeed write a work of history “done to last forever.”50 It is 
deeply imbued with a theoretical understanding of war, its conduct, and the 
terrible consequences that it produces. the sad record of the 2,400-some-odd 
years since its completion is an endless repetition of the same pattern. yet while 
The History of the Peloponnesian war is of great importance in the twenty-first 
century, the modern age is perhaps even less prepared than its original audience 
for its deep and abiding insights. thucydides has provided us with an under-
standing of war and strategy from the highest to the lowest level. but to grasp 
that understanding, readers today must grapple with a number of issues. first is 
the fact that they have in most cases little knowledge of the geography of ancient 
greece, much less the players.51 but that is the least of the problems that beset the 
first-time reader of thucydides. 
In the largest sense, the real difficulty lies in the fact that The History of the 
Peloponnesian war is an enormously sophisticated and complex work, one that 
requires, like Clausewitz’s on war, careful and deep readings. for a society that 
demands instant gratification, such sustained, focused effort represents a major 
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challenge. simply put, thucydides’s history is not an easy or simple read. rather, 
it demands concentrated thought and a willingness to grapple with the text—and 
also with the author, because as sophisticated and perceptive as he is, thucydides 
sometimes, like all historians, loads the dice in favor of his perception of what 
occurred.52 
but in the end readers willing to make the effort will find themselves richly 
rewarded by the understanding that they will be able to bring to the present. 
that great american soldier and statesman george C. Marshall, in an address at 
Princeton at the beginning of the Cold War, doubted “whether a man can think 
with full wisdom and with conviction regarding certain of the basic international 
issues today who has not reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian 
War.”53 Marshall could not have been more right about his own time—or ours.
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